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Wireless body sensor networks (WBSNs) mostly consist of low-cost sensor nodes and implanted devices which generally have
extremely limited capability of computations and energy capabilities. Hence, traditional security protocols and privacy enhancing
technologies are not applicable to the WBSNs since their computations and cryptographic primitives are normally exceedingly
complicated. Nowadays, mobile wearable and wireless muscle-computer interfaces have been integrated with the WBSN sensors for
various applications such as rehabilitation, sports, entertainment, and healthcare. In this paper, we propose MGRNG, a novel muscle
activity-driven green-oriented random number generation mechanism which uses the human muscle activity as green energy
resource to generate random numbers (RNs). The RNs can be used to enhance the privacy of wearable device communications
and secure WBSNs for rehabilitation purposes. The method was tested on 10 healthy subjects as well as 5 amputee subjects with
105 segments of simultaneously recorded surface electromyography signals from their forearm muscles. The proposed MGRNG
requires only one second to generate a 128-bit RN, which is much more efficient when compared to the electrocardiography-based
RN generation algorithms. Experimental results show that the RNs generated from human muscle activity signals can pass the
entropy test and the NIST random test and thus can be used to secure the WBSN nodes.

1. Introduction
Over the last few years, the growing interest in the wireless
body sensor network (WBSN) has resulted in thousands of
peer-reviewed publications. Significant results in this area
have enabled many medicine and healthcare applications.
A WBSN interconnects tiny and wireless sensor nodes and
devices worn on or implanted in the human body that have
the capability to acquire physiological signals such as electrocardiography (ECG) [1, 2], electromyography (EMG) [3], and
electroencephalography (EEG) [4], as well as data about the
physical state of individuals which include walking, running,
and seating [5–7]. A wide spectrum of WBSNs applications

that include different kinds of wearable devices has been
developed and applied for, e.g., physical fitness monitoring,
and chronic diseases monitoring. Figure 1 illustrates the most
typical usage scenarios for a WBSN-based rehabilitation
system with wearable devices. In such a rehabilitation system,
the EMG signals can be collected by wearable WBSN devices
from an injured patient’s upper arm, processed and then used
to control an artificial limb in order to facilitate the injured or
disabled people’s daily works and lives.
Although the WBSN technologies bring obvious and
attractive benefits to facilitate people’s life activity, there are
many concerns and challenges to be addressed. The first
important concern of WBSN is related to security and privacy
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Figure 1: A WBSN-based rehabilitation system with the EMG signals collection, processing, and artificial limb controlling.
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Figure 2: A basic structure of wireless body sensor networks.

challenges. A typical WBSN system consists of a number
of wearable biomedical sensors or wireless muscle-computer
interfaces worn on or even implanted in a single person;
it also involves a base station which can be a wearable
computer, a smart watch, or a smart phone. The base station is
responsible for collecting physiological signals from a patient
through wearable biomedical sensors placed on a human
by using of Wi-Fi, ZigBee, and/or Bluetooth networking
technologies (as shown in Figure 2). However, due to limited
bandwidth resource and computing capabilities, wearable
WBSN devices provide less security and authentication

system (in comparison to traditional personal computers,
laptops, and other computing devices). Consequently, we
have reason to believe that attacks targeting wearable WBSN
devices with the aim of malicious disruption or worse will
rise. As numerous wearable devices make their way into the
WBSNs with a much more open structure, they undoubtedly
bring a WBSN system of security and privacy challenges.
Aside from the wearable devices, there will also be a rise
in the number of targeted attacks focused on interrupting
WBSN signal transmission or even stealing personal data.
In a WBSN system, wearable devices generally have limited
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storage and computation capabilities, they require to pair
with other wearable electronic devices to perform most
functions. In other word, a WBSN system is more like a tiny
switching system [8, 9]. In such a system, a wearable WBSN
device needs to communicate with other computing devices
(e.g., a mobile phone and a wearable personal computer) via
Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, or ZigBee connections for the data to be
processed. During the communications between a wearable
device and a computing device, these personal data should be
properly protected from all forms of security threats posed by
potential attackers, since the data normally contains sensitive
health information [10–14]. The unauthorized usage of the
data will breach the users’ privacy and could be even harmful
to their life.
The second concern of WBSN is the energy consumption
problem. In the WBSN systems, a wearable device generally
has extremely limited energy capacity and is frequently
constrained by the volume of energy resource available in
its battery. Moreover, a wearable device is not a standalone
device as it needs to send the collected biomedical data
to a computing device using Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, or ZigBee
networking technology, which means that apart from the
energy consumption of data collection an energy-constrained
wearable device needs to spend a considerable amount of
energy resource for the biomedical packet transmission. The
high power consumption of wearable devices will limit the
WBSN lifetime because if one or more wearable devices
run out of battery, the whole WBSN system may fail to
work. Therefore, a promising WBSN-based design has to take
into consideration energy overhead and optimization policy
[15].
In this paper, we propose a novel muscle activitydriven green-oriented random number generation mechanism (MGRNG) which uses the human muscle activity as
green energy resource to generate random numbers (RNs).
The RNs can be used to enhance the privacy of wearable
device communications and secure WBSNs for rehabilitation
purposes. To this end, we study a different type of physiological signal for the random number (RN) generation
purpose, that is, the EMG signals recorded from the muscle(s)
via a surface or intramuscular electrode(s) placed on the
muscle(s) [3]. The method was tested on 10 healthy subjects
as well as 5 amputee subjects with 105 segments of simultaneously recorded surface electromyography signals from
their forearm muscles. The proposed MGRNG requires only
one second to generate a 128-bit RN, which is much more
efficient when compared to the electrocardiography-based
RN generation algorithms.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, a problem statement with a clear description of the
security and privacy issue in a WBSN system is presented
in order to explain our motivation. Section 3 presents the
EMG signal-based RN generation algorithm, describes the
experimental settings and determines performance metrics
in order to evaluate the proposed EMG-based RN generation
scheme. Section 4 evaluates and analyzes the performance
of the proposed solution. Section 5 discusses the limitations
of the work and gives some interesting directions for future
work. Section 6 concludes the paper.

3

2. Problem Statement
Nowadays, with the widespread use of WBSNs, the shapes
and functionalities of WBSN devices are evolving dramatically. Among them, wearable devices are becoming even more
important as sales of wearable devices continue to see yearover-year growth [17]. Typically, wearable WBSN devices
facilitate the daily life and works. Unfortunately, wearable
WBSN devices become a vulnerable and attractive target
of most attacks because of the lack of security mechanisms
[18]. Moreover, a wearable WBSN device becomes more and
more lucrative target because it collects and shares an amount
of sensitive personal data with third-parties [19]. Therefore,
wearable WBSN devices bring much more threats to the
WBSN systems and make them face more serious security
and privacy challenges [20, 21].
In a WBSN system, data collected from the wearable
biomedical sensors or other wearable devices is often transmitted to a mobile phone or other portable devices where
it is stored and processed in order to provide real-time
feedback for users in different areas of applications [22].
However, the personal data collected by wearable WBSN
devices may be illegally used by potential attackers [23].
Figure 3 presents a scenario that the health information of
individuals maliciously is manipulated by an attacker. As the
figure shows, a wearable electromyography sensor transmits
the collected personal electromyography data to a wearable
watch for data processing and artificial limb controlling.
However, the artificial limb can be out of control because of
malicious manipulation caused by an attacker.
Apart from malicious manipulation, personal data and
biomedical information collected and processed by connected wearable WBSN devices are also increasingly becoming a main target of attacks. A fresh survey has revealed
that there is a rise in the number of targeted attacks focused
on stealing personal data from the wearable WBSN devices
connected to the computing devices [24]. Figure 4 presents
a scenario that the health information of individuals is
intercepted by potential attackers. Although the amount of
personal data and biomedical information collected and
processed in the WBSN systems grows daily, these data and
information with extremely valuable can be easily captured
by hackers and vanished into the black market due to the lack
of security and authentication system in the WBSN systems
[25, 26].
Considering the fact that health information of individuals is subject to interception and manipulation by potential
attackers, the security of data at rest and in transit is a
major challenge in the abovementioned WBSN applications.
Existing traditional asymmetric security methods such as
Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA), Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC), and symmetric methods including Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and Rivest Cipher 5 (RC5) are of high
computational complexity. Hence, these algorithms cannot
be directly applied to the WBAN systems since they have
limited computing resources. To develop an efficient security
mechanism for WBSN systems, previous studies have proposed the use of features extracted from physiological signals
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Figure 3: The health information of individuals is subject to manipulation by potential attackers: an example.
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Figure 4: The health information of individuals is subject to interception by potential attackers: an example.

like ECG and EEG collected via wireless sensors and wearable
devices for random number generation.
Currently, most of the random numbers generated from
ECG features are based on the process of Interpulse Intervals
(IPIs) extracted from the signal [16]. In previous studies,
a method using IPIs to encode 128-bit random number
sequence with reasonable randomness performance shows
that if a single IPI is encoded into 4-bits, then at least 32
IPIs have to be extracted from the ECG signal. This implies
that the WBSN sensor nodes need to successfully detect at
least 33 consecutive heartbeats [16]. Considering that the
normal sinus rhythm of an adult lies between 60 and 100 beats
per minute (bpm), generating a 128-bit of random number
sequence would require about 20 seconds. Hence, the IPIbased methods may not be suitable for real-time applications

of WBSN systems since it requires a considerable amount of
time.
Furthermore, recent WBSN efforts are devoted to generating random numbers for securing the data associated
with WBSN devices, by exploiting the characteristics of EEG
signals [4]. Although their research reports reveal that the
EEG-based method is comparable to the existing ECG-based
methods, it is important to note that the EEG-based random
number generation method has a number of issues which
may limit its application in real-time systems. These issues
are as follows: (a) processing acquired EEG signals requires a
relatively high computing resources because the signals have
poor signal-to-noise ratio; (b) EEG signal acquisition would
generally require precise deployment of dozens of electrodes
around the head and the use of various gels, saline solutions,
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and/or pastes to keep the electrodes in place, which would
severely affect the daily life of the individual and make the
user feel uncomfortable.
Compared to the abovementioned IPI-based methods,
EMG signals sampled at the rate of 1000Hz can be used to
generate a 128-bit random sequence with only one second.
More importantly, in comparison to the EEG, EMG signals
require less computing resources with a simplified data
collection procedure. In this paper, we propose MGRNG, a
novel random number generation algorithm which is based
on features extracted from EMG recordings. The randomness
of the 128-bit RNs was exhaustively examined by using the
entropy metric. We believe that these EMG-based RNs can
be further used to protect both data at rest and in transit
in a WBSN system. More specifically, our solution makes
important contributions in the following aspects:
(i) It introduces a green-oriented RN generation method
which exploits the human muscle activities as energy
resources to generate RNs and improve on wearable
device communication by being more energy efficient.
(ii) It designs a fast RN generation scheme which generates a 128-bit random sequence in a timely fashion.
The muscle activity-based RNs can be further used to
enhance the security and privacy in WBSNs.

3. MGRNG Detail Design
This paper is devoted to exploring the possibility of resolving
a critical security issue associated with data storage and
transmission among the wearable devices and nodes in
WBSN systems. To this end, we propose a novel security
method dubbed as MGRNG. MGRN contributes to generating an EMG-based 128-bit RN for secure communication
over WBSN systems. Figure 5 presents the architecture of
MGRNG, which reveals how the EMG signals are collected

(from the upper arm of an amputee subject and the forearm
of a healthy subject), then processed, and encoded for RN
generation.
3.1. EMG-Based RN Generation. In the MGRNG solution,
there are five stages included to generate RN: (i) EMG
signal collection, (ii) EMG signal sampling, (iii) EMG signal
segmenting, (iv) feature extraction, and (v) RN generation. Figure 6 shows the technological processes of EMG
signal-based RNs generation scheme in MGRNG. A detailed
description of each of these five stages is presented as follows
in order to help the readers understand easily:
(i) EMG Signal Collection: In MGRNG, the EMG signals
are collected from an upper arm of an amputee subject
and forearm of a healthy subject through wearable
biomedical sensors placed on these subjects.
(ii) EMG signal sampling: The analog EMG signals are
converted into digital EMG signals by using an
Analog-to-Digital (A/D) converter, and every EMG
signal is sampled at the rate of 1000Hz.
(iii) EMG Signal Segmenting: These collected EMG signals
are divided into 128 segments in order to further used
for 128-bit RNs generation.
(iv) Feature Extraction: There are many methods can be
used for signal denoising and EMG signal extraction.
In this study, we choose the wavelet analysis method
for signal denoising and EMG signal extraction since
as a mature technology, wavelet analysis has proven to
be invaluable in signals analysis and processing. More
details on the wavelet analysis method can be found
in [27].
(v) RN Generation: Encoding these extracted EMG features generates a sequence of random numbers (a 128bit RN) for the purpose of secure WBSN communications.
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Definition:
𝑆𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 : all subjects who are volunteers for EMG collection
𝑊𝑆𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 : all wearable sensor used to acquire the EMG signals
𝐸𝑆𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 : all the EMG signals collected from subjects
1: for (𝑖 = 1, 𝑖 ≤ count(𝑆𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 ), 𝑖 + +) do
2:
for (𝑗 = 1, 𝑗 ≤ count(𝑊𝑆𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 ), 𝑗 + +) do
3:
execute EMG signal acquisition;
4:
end for
5: end for
6: for (𝑘 = 1, 𝑘 ≤ count(𝐸𝑆𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 ), 𝑘 + +) do
7:
take the EMG signal sample;
8:
divide EMG signals into 128 segments;
9:
extract EMG features using wavelet analysis method;
10:
encode the EMG features to generate 128-bit RNs.
11: end for
Algorithm 1: EMG-based RN generation algorithm.

In this study, we use 256 EMG signals from each subject
to generate a number of RNs which are of different lengths.
Each EMG signal was encoded into different bits to result
in RNs of length varying from 512 bits to 2816 bits. Then
the RNs were divided into 128 bit segments. To this end, we
developed an algorithm with MATLAB programming tool
to detect and exclude the invalid data segments in the EMG
recordings. Afterwards, the features were extracted from the
preprocessed EMG signals and utilized to generate 128-bit
RNs, and a total of 105 (15 subjects including 10 healthy
subjects (HS) and 5 disabled subjects (DS), and each subject
has 7 sensors) RNs were generated. The experimental protocols were approved by the Shenzhen Institutes of Advanced
Technology Institutional Review Board, Chinese Academy of
Sciences. All the subjects agreed and gave written informed
consent as well as permission for the publication of their
photographs and data for scientific and educational purposes.
The pseudo code of the EMG-based RN generation algorithm
is presented in Algorithm 1.
From Algorithm 1, it can be seen that the EMG-based
RN generation method would at least have the following
advantages: (i) an EMG is a very low-risk procedure, (ii) the
EMG signals can be easily acquired from muscle activities,

(iii) compared with most of the traditional pseudorandom
number generation solution [7], the EMG-based RN generation method neither requires a random seed nor complex
computation operations, and (iv) compared with the classic
ECG/EEG-based number generation solutions [4, 16], the
EMG-based RN generation method requires less computing
resources and shorter time to generate RNs. For these reasons,
we believe that the proposed EMG-based RN generation
method will become a promising technology used to generate
RNs for securing data confidentiality in WBSNs.
3.2. Performance Metric Determination. Considering the fact
that the entropy is an important metric to measure and reflect
the randomness and uncertainty of matter in a system, in
this paper, we select entropy as the performance metric to
measure and evaluate the randomness of the EMG-based
RNs. We calculate the entropy values for these generated
EMG-based RNs by using the following formula:
𝑁

𝑆 = −𝐾 × ∑ 𝑃𝑖 ln (𝑃𝑖 ) ,

(1)

𝑖=1

where 𝐾 is a constant, 𝑃𝑖 is the uncertainty (probability) of
the 𝑖th RN, and 𝑁 is the number of RNs.
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𝐸𝑀 =

𝑀
1
× ∑ 𝑒𝑖 ,
𝑀 𝑖=1

(2)

where 𝐸𝑖 is an entropy value, 𝑀 is the number of entropy
values, and 𝐸𝑀 is the mean entropy of RNs generated from
each EMG sensor.
Formula (2) is a general formula for the mean entropy
value calculation. In order to reduce the computational
complexity, we use an iterative method (see (3)) to calculate
the mean entropy value:
𝐸𝑀+1 =

𝐸𝑀 × 𝑀 + 𝑒𝑀+1
,
𝑀+1

(3)

Descriptions
The frequency test
The frequency test block
The runs test
The longest runs ones block test
The approximate entropy test

×10-4
1.5
1
0.5
0
−0.5

−1.5
0 0.8 1.6 2.4 3.2 4 4.8 5.6 6.4 7.2 8 8.8 9.6
Time (ms)

×104

Figure 7: The EMG amplitudes between time 𝑡 = 0 ms and 𝑡 = 10
ms.

2

∑𝑀
𝑖=1 (𝑒𝑖 − 𝐸𝑀 )
𝑀−1

(4)

,

Equation (4) is a general formula for calculating the
SD value. In order to reduce the computational complexity,
we also calculate the SD value utilizing an iterative method
presented in the following formula:
2

𝜎𝑀+1

Test cases
F Test
B Test
R Test
L Test
A Test

−1

We use the previous mean entropy 𝐸𝑀 and the new
entropy value 𝑒𝑀+1 to calculate the current mean entropy
value 𝐸𝑀+1 . This means that the current mean entropy is
updated according to the newly recorded entropy values.
Similarly, the general formula for calculating the standard
deviation (SD) is presented in the following:
𝜎𝑀 = √

Table 1: The five most commonly used NIST tests.

Amplitude (mV)

Moreover, in order to further convince the effectiveness of
these generated RNs, we calculate the mean entropy value and
standard deviation of RNs generated from each EMG sensor
placed on every subject. Assuming the obtained entropy
values are 𝑒1 , 𝑒2 , 𝑒3 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 𝑒𝑚 , we calculate the mean value of the
entropies by using the following formula:

𝜎2 × (𝑀 − 1) (𝑒𝑀+1 − 𝐸𝑀)
=√ 𝑀
+
,
𝑀
𝑀+1

the RNs to be no less than 1,000,000 bits. In this study, we
only focus on evaluating an EMG-based RN with a length
of only 128 bits; thus we just utilize the five commonly used
NIST tests (namely, F Test, B Test, R Test, L Test, and A Test)
to verify the randomness of the generated RNs. Moreover,
interested readers can refer to our previous work [16] for more
detail information on how the NIST tests are conducted for
the generated RNs.

(5)

By using (5), we can calculate the new SD 𝜎𝑀+1 using
only four variables: the previous SD 𝜎𝑀, the previous mean
entropy value 𝐸𝑀, the current entropy value 𝑒𝑀+1 , and the
previous records of entropy 𝑀.
The mean entropy and the entropy SD values obtained
from (3) and (5) can be used as references for evaluating
the randomness and effectiveness of these generated EMGbased RNs. Furthermore, we also use 15 tests provided by the
US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
to validate the performance of RNs [7]. Specifically, we
implement the five commonly used NIST tests (see Table 1)
as part of effort to further examine the randomness of our
proposed method. In other words, the five NIST tests have
been used in this work for evaluating the randomness of the
128 bit RNs and the pass rates have been defined as the ratio of
the numbers of 𝑝 value greater than 0.01 divided by the total
generated RNs.
It is worthy to note that the NIST suite consists of 15
different tests [3–5], and some of them require the length of

4. Results and Analysis
In order to generate 128 bit EMG-based RNs and then
evaluate the randomness of them, we pull the EMG samples
from total 15 subjects including 10 healthy subjects (HS)
and 5 disabled subjects (DS); each subject has 7 wearable
biomedical sensors to gather the EMG signals. Figure 7
presents the EMG amplitudes collected from one of these
subjects (only EMG amplitudes between time 𝑡 = 0 ms and
𝑡 = 10 ms are illustrated in the figure in order to better show
the results).
After EMG feature extraction, feature encoding and
RN generation, we calculate the entropy values for these
generated RNs by using (1). From the obtained entropy values
shown in Table 2, it was observed that the entropy values of
the generated RNs varied from 0.9887 to 0.9998 among the 7
EMG sensors for a representative healthy subject. Meanwhile,
for an arbitrarily selected amputee, an entropy value that
ranged between 0.9914 and 1.0000 was recorded for the
generated RNs based on EMG recordings from the seven
sensors.
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Table 2: The entropy of RNs generated from EMG signals extracted from seven sensors (a healthy subject vs. an amputee subject).

No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

A healthy subject
0.9887
0.9998
0.9914
0.9998
0.9914
0.9984
0.9972

An amputee subject
0.9937
1.0000
0.9993
0.9972
0.9956
0.9914
0.9937

Table 3: The entropy of each sensor of health and disabled subjects.
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

MEHS
0.9967
0.9861
0.9959
0.9948
0.9996
0.9952
0.9973

VHS
1.88 × 10−5
3.02 × 10−5
1.51 × 10−4
1.03 × 10−5
2.80 × 10−6
9.40 × 10−6
1.74 × 10−5

MEAS
0.9968
0.9913
0.9964
0.9962
0.9976
0.9967
0.9981

VAS
6.80 × 10−6
1.70 × 10−5
7.10 × 10−6
5.28 × 10−5
9.13 × 10−5
1.61 × 10−3
1.50 × 10−6

Table 4: The entropy of each sensor of health and disabled subjects.
Name
Health subjects (our Best)
Amputee subjects (our Best)
Subjects with myocardial infarction [6]
Subjects with other CVD [6]
Healthy subjects [6]

Table 3 presents the average entropy of RNs generated
from each EMG sensor (i.e., from sensor 1 to sensor 7) placed
on 10 healthy and 5 amputee subjects. It shows that the mean
entropy of RNs generated from 10 healthy subjects (MEHS)
varies from 0.9861 to 0.9996. Meanwhile, the mean entropy
of RNs generated from 5 amputee subjects (MEAS) varies
from 0.9913 to 0.9981. The overall average entropy of both
categories of subjects per sensor varied from 0.9887 to 0.9986
(i.e., from sensor 1 to sensor 7). The variance of health subjects
(VHS) varied from 2.80×10−6 to 1.51×10−4 , and the variance
of amputee subjects (VAS) varied from 1.50 × 10−6 to 1.61 ×
10−3 . Moreover, by comparison with the mean entropy values,
we found that the mean of entropy of RNs generated from
EMG signals in our proposed approach is better than binary
previously study [6], as shown in Table 4.
Additionally, we implemented the five most commonly
used NIST tests (F Test, B Test, R Test, L Test, and A Test)
as part of effort to clarify the randomness of our proposed
method. We found out through experiment that, the pass
rates of the five NIST tests varied from 0.9857 to 1.0000 for
the healthy subjects and from 0.9714 to 1.0000 for the amputee
subjects, as shown in Figures 8 and 9, respectively.
Through analyzing the results, we can observe that the
entropy values of RNs generated from the representative
healthy and amputee subjects shown in Table 2 are observed

Mean of entropy
0.9996
0.9981
0.9902
0.9899
0.9893

Variance of entropy
2.80 × 10−6
1.50 × 10−6
2.31 × 10−6
2.96 × 10−6
3.46 × 10−6

to be close to 1.00, which reflects a perfect randomness as well
as a perfect performance. Also, similar performance can be
observed when the entropy of the entire 105 RNs is computed.
By comparing the RNs generated from the sensors deployed
at different positions of the body, the obtained entropy results
show that there is no distinctive difference between RNs from
any two sensors. This implies that the EMG sensor position
has no effect on the randomness of generated RNs.
Furthermore, we investigate the randomness of the
RNs generated based on the features extracted from EMG
recordings of the healthy and amputee subjects and then
compare the results obtained for both categories of subjects.
The rationale behind comparing the RNs of healthy and
amputee subjects is because WBSN systems have been widely
applied for both the healthcare and the sports training. In
healthcare, rehabilitation devices such as the prostheses are
now commonly available to help amputees regain their arm
functions. And the EMG signal patterns obtained from the
amputated arm have been reported to be different from that
obtained from the intact arm [28–30]. In this regard, we
compare the randomness of the RNs generated from the
healthy and amputated subjects to see if the variations in
EMG signal patterns between both categories of subjects
would be different. From the comparison, it can be observed
that there is no distinctive difference between the RNs of the
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Healthy Subjects

1.05

average pass rate of the EMG-based RN generation method is
about 3.54% higher than that of the IPIs-based RN generation
method.

The pass rates

1

5. Discussion

0.95

0.9

0.85

F Test

B Test

R Test
L Test
The ﬁve NIST tests

A Test

Figure 8: The pass rates of 128-bit RNs using five NIST tests (RNs
generated from EMG of healthy subjects).

Amputee Subjects

1.05

The pass rates

(i) Despite the promising results achieved by the proposed EMG-based RNs generation method, it may
not be applicable to persons with neuromuscular
disorder, who lack the ability to provide EMG signals
from which RNs could be generated.
(ii) It is unknown whether the proposed EMG-based
RNs generation method would be robust to variation
in muscle contraction level. Therefore, we plan to
investigate this issue in our future study.

1

(iii) It is unknown what the capabilities of the EMGbased RNs are allowed to an attacker. Our future work
will study the existing threat models [31] and further
define a proper threat model to assess the security
capabilities of a WBSN system with the EMG-based
RNs.

0.95

0.9

0.85

In Section 4, we demonstrated how the proposed EMG-based
RNs generation method is robust, we also investigated the
randomness of the EMG-based RNs, and we believe that
the EMG-based RNs can be used to enhance the privacy
of wearable device communications and secure the data in
WBSN systems. In this section, we discuss the limitations
of the work and explore some potential directions for future
research:

F Test

B Test

R Test
L Test
The ﬁve NIST tests

A Test

Figure 9: The pass rates of 128-bit RNs using five NIST tests (RNs
generated from EMG of disabled subjects).

healthy and amputee subjects. We can see from this result that
our proposed method is robust and could be used to secure
the data in WBSN systems regardless of the health status of
the user (whether the user is healthy or not).
We also compare the pass rates of the RNs generated
by the proposed EMG-based RN generation method with
those resulted from the Interpulse Intervals- (IPIs-) based
RN generation method [16] (the pass rates of the 128-bit
RNs generated from IPIs of 20 healthy subjects have been
tested). In order to make the comparison more reasonable,
the pass rates of RNs from healthy subjects generated by the
EMG-based RN generation method and the IPIs-based RN
generation method are illustrated only, as shown in Figure 10.
As the figure shows, the proposed EMG-based RN generation
method outperforms the IPIs-based RN generation method
in all cases in terms of RN pass rate. The subfigure in Figure 10
shows the cumulative average pass rates of the two methods.
As the subfigure shows, the EMG-based RN generation
method achieves a better pass rate in comparison with the
IPIs-based RN generation method. More specifically, the

(iv) It is also unknown whether the proposed EMGbased RNs generation mechanism can be used in the
promising anonymous mutual authentication protocols for wearable sensors. This is a very interesting
topic and will be carried on in our future research.
(v) As discussed in the previous section, we consider five
different NIST tests that could be used to validate the
randomness of RNs of 128-bit length. However, as a
secure RN generator, it should be better to pass all
the 15 NIST tests. We will extend our proposal and
evaluate the randomness under those test cases.
(vi) In addition, we believe that a WBSN system with the
promising collaboration computing and multipathing
technologies [32–36] is an interesting topic worth
further investigation. In our future work, we will also
apply these promising technologies to optimize the
performance of the WBSN systems.

6. Conclusion
In this paper, we present a novel EMG-based RN generation method which uses the human muscle activity as
green energy resource to generate 128 bit RNs for securing
data communication in a WBSN system. Compared to the
previously proposed methods that used ECG features to
generate RNs for securing the data in WBSN systems [16],
our EMG-based approach could generate random numbers
with comparable performance and high speed of generation
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The cumulative average
pass rate

1.1
1.08

Pass rates

1.06
1.04

1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
IPI-based RN generation method
EMG-based RN generation method

1.02
1
0.98
0.96
0.94

F Test

B Test

R Test
NIST tests

L Test

A Test

EMG-based RN generation method
IPI-based RN generation method

Figure 10: Pass rates of the EMG-based RN generation method as compare to the IPI-based RN generation method [16].

(128 bit per second). In addition, the proposed surface EMGbased RNs generation method can be used for real-time
applications for a WBSN system since the signal from a single
EMG sensor would be sufficient to provide the required RNs
based on our experimental results. In addition, unlike the
EEG-based RNs generation method that is sensitive to sensor
position as placed on the scalp of a subject, our proposed
EMG-based approach is insensitive to sensor location on the
muscle, which is an advantage over the recently proposed
EEG-based approach [4]. The results from five NIST statistical tests reveal that the RNs generated by our method can
potentially be used as authentication identifiers or encryption
keys for securing WBSNs.
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